Abstract. John Ford's The Broken Heart (c. 1629) has been interpreted as a play in which Ford's art imposes beauty onto the ugliness of human affairs. In this essay, I argue, instead, that the play depicts beauty as a metaphysical ideal that poisons the characters' ability to embrace life in this world. Friedrich Nietzsche's analysis of the "will to beauty" enables us to see beauty as "Apollo's deception": far from offering redemption, this principle, which works to deny the material and temporal orders, is precisely that which closes off the possibility of salvation for the characters of the play.
J ohn Ford's The Broken Heart (c. 1629) has been interpreted as a play in which "mannered artifice" is able to impose beauty onto the chaos and misery of human affairs. 1 For Sharon Hamilton, each character in the play "makes his blighted life more bearable by envisioning it as a work of art": the "spiritual starvation" of the characters is consequently set against the fact that they are "beautifully stylized." 2 Apollo, god of beautiful form and appearance, and the patron of the Sparta in which the play is set, is thus seen to triumph over the tragedies it charts, offering a means of redemption. 3 In this essay, I argue, instead, that the play depicts beauty as a metaphysical ideal, identical with truth and goodness, which poisons the characters' ability to embrace life in the material world. Beauty, in its guise as the Platonic Idea of "Beauty's beauty" (3.2.11), is "Apollo's deception": far from offering redemption, this concept, which works to deny the material and temporal orders, is precisely that which closes off the possibility of salvation for the characters of the play.
Friedrich Nietzsche insists on the dangers of equating beauty with truth, demonstrating the forgetting of time involved in this metaphysical enterprise. His analysis of the "will to beauty" thus proves fruitful for a reading of The Broken Heart, illuminating the extent to which Ford's play sets time against truth, and humanity against beauty, ultimately demonstrating through the desolation of its tragedy that the reign of Platonic models of truth and beauty entails a deadly devaluation of life in this world.
I
Nietzsche draws our attention to the extent to which Western canons of beauty are premised upon a forgetting of time. Platonism identifies beauty with truth, but this, for Nietzsche, is a fundamental mistake. Beauty, he insists, is not truth, but its opposite: "to experience a thing as beautiful necessarily means experiencing it wrongly" (LN, aph. 10 [167]). For Plato, our eyes, through making beauty visible, lead us to ever-increasing levels of knowledge, enticing us to ascend toward ideal Beauty, the heavenly Form that is the very principle of unity and virtue. Glimpses of beauty on Earth thus intimate and ideally culminate in the contemplation of "beauty's very self," a timeless, unchanging entity, for eternity. 5 For Nietzsche, on the contrary, the beautiful does not represent a higher form of reality but is a "magnificent illusion." 6 Beauty is not a revelation but a covering; it is a "veil" cast over the world. Far from being the ultimate expression of truth and reality, "the beautiful," for Nietzsche, "exists as little as does the good, the true" (LN, 10[167]): it is not the ultimate object of the clear-sighted gaze but is an optical illusion born of shortsightedness.
Instead of existing as an objective reality, perhaps the ultimate reality, as in Platonism, beauty for Nietzsche is a construct imposed upon the world by human minds in quest of a semblance of order. The world, for Nietzsche, is characterized by purposeless chaos. 7 As described in his late notebooks, it is "a monster of force, without beginning, without end. . . . A play of forces and force-waves simultaneously one and 'many' . . . an ocean of forces storming and flooding within themselves, eternally changing . . . a becoming that knows no satiety, no surfeit, no fatigue-this, my Dionysian world of eternal self-creating, of eternal self-destroying . . . This world is the will to power-and nothing besides!" (LN, 38 [12] ). It is a "fundamental prejudice," he insists, to believe that "it is inherent to the true being of things to be ordered, easy to survey, systematic" (LN, 40 [9] ).
As a realm of indistinction and ceaseless violent multiplicity, Nietzsche's world, from a classical perspective, is terrifyingly ugly. Beauty, defined in Platonic terms, is that which is bounded and static, fixed for all time; "the eternity of the beautiful form; the aristocratic law that says, Thus shall it be forever!" Such a construct, though, is "Apollo's deception" (LN, 2[106]), an imposition of human ideals onto a realm that is "for all eternity chaos."
8 Beauty-as order, wholeness, and stasis-is an enticing lie, distracting us from (even as it implicitly defines the terms for the description of) the "ugly" world, that which "is neither perfect, nor beautiful, nor noble," knowing nothing of "order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called" (GS, aph. 109).
Nietzsche's Dionysian world "pays no heed to the individual"; Apollo, by contrast, he who embodies beautiful appearances, represents "the apotheosis of individuation." The Apollonian drive toward beauty is thus the effort to construct identity, or static, bounded, permanent being in the face of the undifferentiated, temporal forces of becoming more fundamentally constitutive of our universe (BT, pp. 23, 29). As Nietzsche comments in his late notebooks, "I took the will to beauty, to remaining fixed in the same forms, as being a temporary remedy and means of preservation" (LN, aph. 2[106] ). In The Birth of Tragedy, Apollo is a "transfiguring appearance," a principle that becomes necessary in order to keep alive the busy world of individuation. If we could imagine dissonance in human form-and what is man but that?-then this dissonance, in order to be able to live, would need a magnificent illusion to cast a veil of beauty over its own essence. This is the true artistic intention of Apollo: whose name summarizes all those countless illusions of beautiful appearance, which in each moment makes existence worth living. (BT, p. 130) Identity, the belief that "identical cases exist," or that a "single subject" exists, is, for Nietzsche, a "fundamental falsification" (LN, 40 [13] ; 40 [42] ). Such concepts, along with notions of the good and the true, are "lovely phantasms" in whose creation ideals of beauty have played a key role: "Let's be the swindlers and beautifiers of humanity!" (LN, 43 [1] ). The "will to beauty" manifests a desire for human mastery: beauty exists because men "have arranged, thought, devised the world to fit, until they could make use of it, until it could be "'reckoned' with" (LN, 40 [36] ). Beauty thus represents the narrowing down of the world to the order of the human:
Man believes that the world itself is filled with beauty-he forgets that it is he who has created it. He alone has bestowed beauty upon the world-alas! only a very human, all too human beauty. . . . Man really mirrors himself in things, that which gives him back his own reflection he considers beautiful: the judgement 'beautiful' is his conceit of his species . . . Is the world actually made beautiful because man finds it so? Man has humanized the world, that is all. But there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to guarantee to us that man constitutes the model for the beautiful. 9 Rather than embodying natural laws or principles, the "aesthetic necessity of beauty" (BT, p. 31), as a human drive, generates these same laws, along with the appearance of moral absolutes: "Apollo wants to bring individual beings to rest precisely by drawing boundaries between them, boundaries which his demands for self-knowledge and moderation impress on us again and again as the most sacred laws of the world" (p. 58). There is nothing universal about the governing principles of beauty. They simply reflect particular cultural priorities, which for the Greeks involved an emphasis on moderation: "the Greeks, under the spell of their morality of moderation, saw and depicted beauty as the Apollo Belvedere." 10 Absent the Greek metaphysical framework, there is no objective reason why the principles of individuation, coherence, and unity of form represented by Apollo should equate to beauty: "we ought really to call him ugly!" (D, aph. 161). As so often for Nietzsche, perspective is everything: "Moderation sees itself as beautiful; it is unaware that in the eye of the immoderate it appears black and sober, and consequently ugly-looking" (D, aph. 361).
If beauty is a human construct, however, imposed upon a world that is blindly indifferent to such categories, it is not, for Nietzsche, without merit. We have a duty to "wakefulness," to rid ourselves of comforting delusions. 11 On the other hand, the shortsightedness that maintains the illusion of beauty is potentially necessary, as well as affirmative. Above all, the "drive" to beauty is all too human: Thus arises our world, our whole world: and no supposed 'true reality,' no 'in-themselves of things,' corresponds to this whole world which we have created, belonging to us alone. (LN, aph. 38 [10] )
The "magnificent illusion" of Apollo therefore serves key purposes. The Greeks may have been color-blind, unable to distinguish blue from green, and therefore less able than we are to see visual differences between humans and the rest of nature, but this "deficiency" was perhaps generative rather than limiting:
Every thinker paints his world in fewer colours than are actually there, and is blind to certain individual colours. This is not merely a deficiency. By virtue of this approximation and simplification he introduces harmonies of colours into the things themselves, and these harmonies possess great charm and can constitute an enrichment of nature. Perhaps it was only in this way that mankind first learned to take pleasure in the sight of existence: existence, that is to say, was in the first instance presented to them in one or two colours, and thus presented harmoniously. (D, aph. 426) Beauty may rely on our shortsighted, color-blind eyes, but this nevertheless means that we are capable of beautifying the world: we do not have to wait passively to discover beauty, but can actively create it. This creative process depends on a willing distortion of vision: "What means do we have for making things beautiful, attractive, and desirable when they are not? And in themselves I think they never are!" In order to see beauty, we must artistically (that is, artificially) rearrange the scene: "to distance oneself from things until there is much in them that one no longer sees and much that the eye must add in order to see them at all, or to see things around a corner and as if they were cut out and extracted from their context, or to place them so that each partially distorts the view one has of the others and allows only perspectival glimpses, or to look at them through coloured glass or in the light of the sunset, or to give them a surface and skin that is not fully transparent." To cover things, or to distort them in this way, in order to beautify them, enables us to be "poets of our lives" (GS, aph. 299).
Elsewhere, moreover, Nietzsche associates the introduction of beauty "into the things themselves" not with blindness but with knowledge. Even "the ugliest reality" can become beautiful, simply through the fact of its being understood: "is anything 'beautiful in itself'? The happiness of the man of knowledge enhances the beauty of the world and makes all that exists sunnier; knowledge casts its beauty not only over things but in the long run into things" (D, aph. 550). Man may have to impose beauty onto the universe, then, rather than discovering it there, but this does not mean that such beauty is without value. Seeing beauty as a human construct in fact widens its scope, which is no longer limited by so-called natural laws of beauty. Understanding that the terms in which we have understood beauty have been shaped by metaphysical frameworks opens up the possibility for whole new realms of the beautiful. The Platonic equation of the beautiful and the good has led us to construct beauty in painfully narrow terms ("a fact which sufficiently accounts for our having found so little of it") but "the realm of beauty is bigger" than this: there are a "hundred kinds of beauty" (D, aph. 468), beyond this definition, if we allow ourselves to understand beauty in different terms.
To redeem the beautiful in this way, though, we have to let go of our attachment to its static metaphysical conceptualization. Central to this reappraisal must be a new focus on the significance of time, a principle denigrated within classical models of beauty. If we reinsert time into the equation, the "realm of beauty" can be extended to include that which has previously been regarded as "ugly." Permanence is the governing principle of "Apollo's deception": "Thus shall it be forever!" In classical models of beauty, time is anathema: time can only decay, corrupt, and annihilate that which in its ideal form must remain whole, static, and unified. Nietzsche, in his late notebooks, acknowledges that the world of endless becoming, as that which rejects the stasis of being, is uncomfortable: "eternally creating, as an eternally-having-to-destroy, is inseparable from pain" (LN, 2[106] ). The "ugliness" of this world can nevertheless be regarded as a generative, and thus as a positive, force: "Ugliness is the way of regarding things that comes from the will to insert a meaning, a new meaning, into what has become meaningless . . . Transience . . . as enjoyment of the engendering and destroying force, as continual creation" (LN, 2[106] ).
For Nietzsche, then, the metaphysical equation of beauty and truth is an error that has generated not only a narrow and unhelpful model of beauty but a fundamental misrepresentation of humanity and the world, in which "the truth is ugly" (LN, 11[108] ). The definition of beauty as unity, wholeness, and completion, and the equation of these principles with goodness and truth, is inextricable from the construction of particular models of identity, premised on self-sameness, unity, and permanence. From this perspective, "the constant transience and volatility of the subject" (LN, 40[42] )-the subject, that is, who inhabits time-is ugly, and is rejected as evil and wrong. Metaphysical models of beauty and truth idealize that which is timeless and fixed, that which keeps its place for all eternity: these are the very terms in which Platonic Beauty, as ideal Form, is conceptualized. The temporal, that which shifts and changes, is downgraded to the status of the corrupt material order, the ugly, tainted world which beauty ultimately, and necessarily, transcends. Metaphysical beauty likewise idealizes unity as its key principle, such that multiplicity and contradiction, the stuff of a life that exists in time, is denigrated as worthless and repugnant. That which is pure must be that which is singular, static, and whole: the opposite of this state is anarchic and evil, a principle of disharmony and pollution that must be purged. As Nietzsche observes, "The aesthetic instinct . . . contains a judgment" of self-preservation (LN, 10[167]), and this instinct structures societies and cultures, as well as individual subjects.
Reading beauty through Nietzsche therefore enables us to regard it as a manifestation of the "will to power": the "will to beauty" is a "perspectival falsification which allows the human species to assert itself" (LN, 43 [1] ). At stake is not only our definition of beauty but our understanding of identity and the world. What are the implications of valuing stasis over temporal change, of prizing being over becoming in the manner insisted on by classical models of beauty?
II
In The Broken Heart, we witness the tragedy of a rigid adherence to metaphysical thinking and the static, unyielding forms of subjectivity it engenders. The play's interest in truth is evident as early as its prologue, where we are told that this work gets beyond the vulgarities of "fiction" to deal with "Truth." 12 Truth is subsequently referred to twenty-one times in the play, compared to only four times in its close contemporary, 'Tis Pity She's a Whore. "Our scene," crucially, "is Sparta" (prologue), and the characters of the play are a study in the implications of living in the light of "Apollo's deception." Michael Neill argues that Apollo is ultimately "enthroned" in the play as "the patron of an order that transcends the confusions and divisions of time" ("UA," p. 268). Yet the desire to transcend time in the name of the truth and beauty represented by Apollo, I suggest, is precisely what drives Sparta's tragedy in this bleakest of plays. Instead of imposing "form" on "dissolution," in the manner stated by Neill, the "eternal artifice" of beauty is an abstract ideal whose pursuit renders life impossible. "Beauty's beauty" cannot bring order into this world, because it must always remain "beyond all fate, all story" (3.2.11-12); that is, beyond the reach of human history. Far from offering consolation, Apollo's patronage removes all hope of salvation.
Other than the oracle itself, the voice of moral authority in the play is Tecnicus, a philosopher who appeals to Apollo to "inspire [his] intellect" (3.1.74). His pupil, the broken-hearted Orgilus, initially pleads for "what is incident to frailty" (1. Human agency, and the "change" this agency makes possible, is rendered illusory by the transcendent order of the divine, which fixes man according to notions of depth and essence. Orgilus, Tecnicus insists, must discard his efforts to alter the terms of his own life and must instead let the "spirit of truth" "inspire" him (1.3.29). His "unsettled mind," as Orgilus accepts, needs "information" (1.3.27-28), in the form of both truth and the rigid, permanent shape that truth must take in this world.
In As the codification of the true, philosophy steers a way out of life. Those who live by its precepts do not have to suffer the transient fortunes experienced by those in the world: they do not "toil" and they do not "sink," both of which imply the progression and change inevitably wrought by time. Instead, they maintain the stasis of "order." Far from being driven by the mercurial passions of the body, their "love" is an abstract principle of desire for the immaterial concept of "virtue." Happiness, then, within this culture, depends on the denigration of the material and the temporal ("the dung of earth" [1.3.181]) in the name of transcendent truth, the possession of which is the highest prize.
Orgilus, like every other character in the play, accepts this prevailing wisdom, and is subsequently possessed by a concept of love as that which necessarily transcends time: "holy and chaste love so fixed our souls . . . that no time / Can eat into the pledge" (1.1.30-32) . His view of time as that which would corrupt a love which is nevertheless immobilized beyond its reach is reiterated when he confronts Penthea, insisting that "Time can never / On the white table of unguilty faith / Write counterfeit dishonour" (2.3.25-27). The constancy of his love, which cannot be undermined by the passing of time, here attains the status of transcendent virtue: his love is pure, "unguilty," authentic, and honorable, all by reason of the fact that it is set against the temporal order.
Existing outside of time, however, means existing outside of the body, leaving Orgilus trapped in a love that perpetually contemplates the "sight of banquet, whilst the body pines / Not relishing the real taste of food" (2.3.36-37). Separated by the vagaries of history from his beloved, Penthea, he remains imprisoned within a transcendent notion of their union, leaving no possibility of relief: "souls sunk in sorrows never are without 'em; / They change fresh airs, but bear their griefs about 'em" (1.1.117-18). As the "shrine of beauty" (1.1.64) and the "light of beauty" (3.2.162), Penthea, as Neill comments, operates as a Platonic Idea of love in the play ("UA," p. 255). She must be pursued, consequently, at the cost of life on this earth: the "dream" of beauty, Ithocles briefly realizes, comes at the cost of the "felicity" of the "senses waking," of "real, visible, material happiness" (4.1.48-50). Driven by a notion of "Beauty's beauty" (3.2.11), the idea of beauty in the abstract, the lovers in the play, as the song in act 3 suggests, are obdurately set on that which must by definition remain "beyond all fate, all story, / All arms, all arts, / All loves, all hearts" (3.2.12-14). Beyond description, beyond human experience, such a model of beauty, as truth, is also beyond all redemption.
No one more excruciatingly embodies the suffering engendered by the implacable reign of truth and beauty in the play than does "lifespent Penthea" (4.2.208). From our first encounter with her, we see the centrality of notions of truth to her sense of honor, as she declares that her "attires / Shall suit the inward fashion of [her] mind" (2.1.99-100). Truth, for Penthea, is synonymous with what is eternally fixed, as, then, must be her own subjectivity: "I have not given admittance to one thought / Of female change" (2.3.55-56), she insists, giving the lie to her jealous husband's misogynistic assumption that a constant woman is a contradiction in terms. Like Orgilus, Penthea believes that their love, not simply born of desire but willed by her dying father, inhabits the order of truth. (Apollo, significantly, represents patriarchal law as well as beautiful form.) To be married against her will to another, as she has been to Bassanes, is less an assault on her body, then, than it is "a rape done on [her] truth" (2.3.79). Her "heart," obdurately fixed not so much on Orgilus as on the idea of their divine love, has been "cruelly" divorced from her body (2.3.57). Love, for both Orgilus and Penthea, transcends the body, but in Penthea's case this extends to the belief that the survival of "true love" demands the renunciation of the body.
Tainted by the touch of another, a "husband" who cannot in fact be such since, in the true order of things, Orgilus is her spouse, Penthea's body has been "ravished" and polluted. She has no room in her vision of her marriage to Orgilus for this "spotted" condition, which offends the "holy" purity of their love: "My true love / Abhors to think that Orgilus deserved / No better favours than a second bed" (2.3.100-2). Trapped within an ideal of love, Penthea is unable to countenance love in the only tangible form in which it is now able to exist. 13 To be loyal to love, she must repudiate her lover: her "true love," the above quotation makes clear, is not Orgilus himself but is synonymous with her own consciousness. Love, then, to Penthea, demands not the opening of the self to the other but self-incarceration.
As Penthea discovers, to the breaking of her heart, an allegiance to love, as truth, goodness, and beauty, cannot be reconciled with material and temporal life: "Love's martyrs must be ever, ever dying" (4.3.153). Love, in the words of the final song, "only reigns in death." Penthea is well aware that her ideals are incompatible with life in this world. "Our home is in the grave," she concludes as early as act 2, an observation celebrated by Bassanes as "perfect philosophy!" (2.3.148-49). Platonic thinking, for Penthea, is thus inextricable from a death wish: "Glories / Of human greatness are but pleasing dreams, / And shadows soon decaying," she laments: "How weary I am of a ling'ring life" (3.5.13-15, 28). Life is a sickness for which the "remedy / Must be a winding-sheet, a fold of lead" (3.5.31-32). Penthea is "life-spent," indeed, her self-starvation a willful act to purge life itself, in all its polluting "fullness" (4.2.152), so that only pure, immaterial truth remains.
She is not the only one in the play to condemn temporal existence, however. To the Spartan king, time is a "languishing disease" (4.3.55). Ithocles, meanwhile, embraces his own death as a means of achieving a "long-looked-for peace" (4.4.70), while Orgilus willingly opens his own veins, declaring, "Welcome, thou ice that sit'st about my heart; / No heat can ever thaw thee" (5.2.155-56). Once again, stasis is idealized; once again, this stasis can only be achieved in death.
14 Calantha takes this principle to its zenith, not only willing herself to death, when she commands her heart to "Crack, crack!" (5.3.77), but demonstrating the possibility of death-in-life, as she dances imperviously on, not responding to the devastating news that is being delivered to her.
Spartan self-control in this play is thus indistinguishable from selfpetrification. 15 The play contains recurring images of the artificial freezing of life into immobile forms, the most spectacular of which is the locking of Ithocles into a mechanical chair. 16 As Thelma N. Greenfield observes, the naming of characters after "qualities" (Orgilus, we are told in the list of characters in the 1633 quarto, means "angry," Penthea "complaint," and Bassanes "vexation") does not depict the "fundamental character traits" of these figures but instead identifies them in relation to "states of being evolving from action and situation." 17 Penthea's "complaint," for example, relates to her unhappy marriage, rather than to her innate nature, while Bassanes's "vexation" represents his current agonies of jealousy.
Instead of evoking the essence of the characters, their names suggest a world in which the situational is mistaken for the essential: that which is ephemeral is assumed to be that which is fixed and true; the historical is (fatally) misrecognized as the eternal. Instead of embracing the passing of time and the changes time brings (Greenfield states, for example, that Bassanes later becomes a model of patience, belying his name), the Sparta of the play insists on freeze-framing the individual into permanent stasis: the characters, as Neill notes, are locked into "monumental constancy" ("UA," p. 249). Bassanes, for instance, embraces self-control to the point that he becomes more "senseless" than a "marble statue" (5.1.46). The "marble statue," which is immured beyond the altering effects of time, is nevertheless synonymous in this play with beauty. Ithocles, "honour of loveliness," is "like a star fixed," his celestial perfection inextricable from an immobility that exhibits his "moderation, / Calmness of nature, measure, bounds and limits" (1.2.44, 35-36). Calantha, meanwhile, is told, "A perfect purity of blood enamels / The beauty of [her] white" (5.2.23-24), again highlighting the necessary stoniness of that which is "perfect," while Penthea's "fixed" posture is attractively "wholesome" to Bassanes (2.3.137-38). In a world where self-controlled moderation is the ultimate moral ideal ("Nothing too much" is one of Apollo's mottos), the beautiful is thus indistinguishable from the adamantine. 18 "Every drop / Of blood," as Penthea observes, "is turned to an amethyst" (4.2.129-30).
Glitteringly, inexorably beautiful to the end, the Spartan court implodes, with Calantha's coronation-cum-wedding-cum-funeral acting as a final, stylized emblem of the inextricability of beauty and death in this realm. 19 The Spartans strictly adhere to the truth, but the most foolish among them, Bassanes, is able to see that "here in Sparta there's not left amongst us / One wise man to direct" (5. 1.3-4) . In this world of abstraction, it is even possible to believe that Spartan "mastery" can enable one to "fatten and keep smooth the outside / . . . Without the help of food" (4.2.162-65). Prizing beauty above all things-"There is more divinity / In beauty than in majesty" (4.1.80-82)-and equating this beauty with fixed and immaterial forms of truth and goodness, the Sparta of the play has tragically forgotten the more human truth that "truth is the child of time" (4.3.39). This proverb is cited twice in the play, yet its wisdom is disregarded by all the main characters. Under "great Apollo's beams" (1.1.99), seeking a static and instantly knowable form of illumination, they miss the insight that "the pith of oracles / Is then to be digested when th'events/ Expound their truth, not brought as soon to light / As uttered" (4.3.36-39).
It is not for nothing that the words of the oracle are so opaque: truth is not a logical maxim to be grasped instantaneously in the abstract, but must be lived out as a practical reality. As the final song informs us, time is all we have, and cannot therefore be divorced from truth: "Time alone doth change and last" (5.3.90). As this statement suggests, the truth may not, in the end, be represented by the unity and identity of eternal forms, but may inhabit duality and paradox, precisely because it inhabits time. Time, therefore, "is precious," as Grausis tries to tell Penthea, only to be told, "Furies whip thee!" (2.1.91-92). Having forgotten time, the characters of The Broken Heart have put themselves beyond the reach of redemption: under the reign of truth and beauty, outside of time, there can be only judgment. In a play resounding with the word "never," they find themselves "buried in an everlasting silence, / And shall be, shall be ever" (2.3.69-70), having perished of (their version of) the truth. 20 
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